
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Social Housing and Location Choices of Immigrants 
in France





Mirna Saﬁ   
Social Housing and Location Choices 




CNRS, CREST, CEPR and IZA 
 
Francis Kramarz 






Sciences Po and CREST 
 
 







P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  






Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 














Social Housing and Location Choices of Immigrants in France 
 
Our study examines the empirical links between social housing policy and location choices of 
immigrants in France. More specifically, we characterize the main individual and contextual 
determinants of the probability for immigrants to live in a HLM (habitations à loyer modéré, 
dwelling with a moderate rent), which is the main public housing policy in France. For that 
purpose, we use individual information coming from large (one-fourth) extracts of the French 
population censuses conducted by INSEE (Paris) in 1982, 1990, and 1999. Our estimates 
show that, in general, migrants live more frequently in social housing than French natives, 
other observables being equal. In particular, this probability is higher for migrants from 
Turkey, Morocco, Southeast Asia, Algeria, Tunisia and Sub-Saharan Africa (in descending 
order). We find also that migrants of all origins live less often in a HLM when the city has 
plenty of social housing and when the fraction of natives is high. 
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 1 Introduction
In the context of increasing ethnic and racial tensions in several European countries and growing
in￿uence of far right political parties in some of these countries, welfare use by immigrants (and
more generally, the cost of immigration) is gaining importance in both the political and scienti￿c
debates. Research on this topic has emerged in the 1990s’ in the USA leading to some controversial
￿ndings (Borjas (1990); Borjas (1999); Kaushal (2005)). In Europe, and particularly in France,
such studies remain very rare. Recently, some empirical research tried to measure immigrants’
responses to di￿erences in welfare systems across European countries. The idea is to measure the
extent to which the choice of a destination country within the European continent is correlated
with the more or less generosity of its welfare system. Research on this topic ￿nds little empirical
support to the welfare magnets hypothesis elaborated by Borjas (Brucker, Epstein, McCormick,
Saint-Paul, Venturini, and Zimmermann (2002); Nannestad (2007)). Moreover, several studies
address the issue of the validity of the welfare magnets approach in the European context. Im-
migration legislations and policies are so di￿erent across European countries, on the one hand,
and the process of legal immigration is so di￿cult in the context of restrictive policies widespread
all over the continent, on the other hand, that speaking of immigrants’ choices of their destina-
tion country is quite unrealistic. Evidence has been more convincing on immigrants’ responses
to geographical di￿erences in the sizes of the foreign-born populations, or co-ethnics populations,
rather than to welfare di￿erentials (Card (2007); Edin, Fredriksson, and ¯slund (2003); Zavodny
(2005)). Network e￿ects seem to be more powerful than welfare magnets.
However, the literature on immigration and welfare is also interested in measuring the extent to
which immigrants’ ￿nancial contribution to the welfare system is more of less signi￿cant than their
welfare dependency. Here the underlying hypothesis is that immigrants’ welfare dependency is
higher than the one of comparable natives, because of a moral hazard issue speci￿c to immigration
(Nannestad (2007)). This approach is typical of the economic approach of immigration in terms
of a cost-bene￿t analysis (see, for instance, Borjas (1994)). Studies on this ‘welfare gap’ have been
2set forth both in the USA and in Europe (see, for instance, Hansen and Lofstrom (2003)). Borjas
and Hilton (1996) ￿nd that only a minor part of the initial gap between natives and immigrants
remain unexplained after controlling for a wide range of covariates. In Europe, Brucker, Epstein,
McCormick, Saint-Paul, Venturini, and Zimmermann (2002) study this gap across several Euro-
pean countries and ￿nd some support for the hypothesis of immigrants’ speci￿c moral hazard.
De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) explore the issue of welfare migration across the countries of the
pre-enlargement European Union and ￿nd a signi￿cant but small e￿ect of the generosity of welfare
on migration decisions. More recently, a French study has tried to measure immigrants’ welfare
dependency in France (GØlot and Minni (2009)). The authors ￿nd that African immigrants are
more dependent on welfare, as far as employment and income measures are concerned. However,
African immigrants seem to have a lower access to some public services, such as health care and
housing.
Despite some empirical support for a higher immigrants’ dependency on welfare, the inter-
pretation of these ￿ndings does not go without saying. Immigrants’ dependency may indeed be
related to their exposure to intense ethnic and racial discrimination in the labour and housing
markets. It may also re￿ect their higher vulnerability to the economic situation (i.e. they are the
￿rst to be laid o￿ during recessions). This is the reason why policy implications of the literature on
immigration and welfare are still controversial. Should the State exclude migrants (especially re-
cently arrived ones) from some welfare programs, or should it rather increase the social protection
of immigrants, especially during economic crisis?
There is now a substantial economic literature on the location choices of immigrants in their
destination countries. For instance, in a pioneering study, Bartel (1989) has shown that post-1964
U.S. immigrants are more geographically concentrated than natives of the same age and ethnicity,
and reside in cities with a large ethnic population. In a much-quoted article, Borjas (1999) found
that U.S. immigrant welfare recipients are more heavily clustered in high-bene￿t states that the
immigrants who do not receive welfare, or than natives. This ￿nding was then disputed by Kaushal
(2005) who ￿nds that safety-net programs have little e￿ect on the location choices of newly arrived
3low-skilled unmarried immigrant women. In Europe, some studies have also examined the welfare
participation rates of immigrants. For instance, in an empirical analysis using Swedish data,
Hansen and Lofstrom (2003) ￿nd that immigrants use welfare to a greater extent than natives,
and that di￿erences cannot be explained by observable characteristics. However, to the best of
our knowledge, no econometric study has focused on the access of immigrants to social housing
programs which are frequently implemented in Europe.
Our study is devoted to this speci￿c issue. It examines the empirical links between social
housing policy and location choices of immigrants in France. In France, the main public housing
policy is the HLM (habitations ￿ loyer modØrØ, dwelling with a moderate rent ) program. Any
family is eligible for residing in a HLM dwelling provided that the head of the family is allowed to
live in France and that income per unit of consumption lies below a threshold, which depends on
the region of residence and is updated each year. Eligible families may apply for a HLM in any
city (commune) where such public programs exist, regardless of their current place of residence
or nationality. Today, more than 12 millions of persons live in a HLM.
Despite the fact that in France, migration waves were quite intense during the launching of
the ￿rst program of HLM construction, the massive presence of immigrants in such dwellings is
rather a recent phenomenon (Barou (2002); Barou (2006)). Up to the sixties, immigrants lived
overwhelmingly in shanty towns, either in very insalubrious hovels or in private cheap hotels.
In year 1971, the government decided to demolish these uninhabitable buildings and immigrants
were gradually rehoused, mostly in HLM. However, Pin￿on (1981) shown that immigrants had
at that time a lower probability to live in a HLM dwelling, once socioeconomic covariates were
taken into account. In particular, his study shed light on the intense selection mechanisms of
immigrants who were accepted in HLM dwellings. According to him, the HLM administration was
indeed concerned about the quality of ￿cohabitation￿ between natives and immigrants, which was
perceived as problematic especially for non European migrants. From the nineties, immigrants,
and also more generally low-income native families, began to be more and more numerous in HLM
dwellings (Barou (2005)). Moreover, at the same moment, residential mobility out of the HLM
4drastically decreased.
In this paper, we characterize the main individual and contextual determinants of the proba-
bility to live in a HLM for immigrants residing in France. We use individual information coming
from large extracts of the French population censuses conducted by INSEE ( Institut National de
la Statitstique et des Etudes Economiques , Paris) in 1982, 1990, and 1999. The census source is
especially relevant for our study since it allows us to deal with signi￿cant samples of immigrants,
according to their origin country, these groups being generally too small in French surveys. It con-
tains relevant information about the observable individual characteristics of immigrants (country
of birth, age, marital situation, occupation, human capital, etc.). We add to this information some
contextual variables that are extracted from the exhaustive censuses. For instance, we precisely
know the size of the migrant’s community and the number of foreigners in his/her city ( commune)
of residence, but also the number of persons living in HLM buildings in this city at each census
date. Our ￿rst objective is thus to estimate the e￿ects of these individual and contextual covari-
ates on the probability to live at a given date (namely, at the date of the census) in a HLM for
natives and for the di￿erent groups of immigrants (according to their country of origin, the size of
their family, their education, their age, etc.), and the evolution of this probability through time.
The identi￿cation of the model is permitted by the fact that the proportion of persons living in
HLMs varies across cities (communes) and over time.
2 Data
2.1 Statistical sources and variables
For more than a century France has been an immigration country and was one of the ￿rst in
Europe. However, France does not o￿cially recognize an ethnic status within its population, so
ethnicity must be inferred by foreign-birth status. Consequently, the migrants consist of those in
France who did not have French nationality at birth but could have obtained it after. Within this
5group we can distinguish between di￿erent subgroups according to the countries of origin. The
main groups of migrants include those born in Spain, Italy, Portugal, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia,
Turkey, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Other migrants are classi￿ed by groups of countries (other
European countries, other African countries, other Asian countries, America and Oceania).
Migrants in France can be identi￿ed through di￿erent data sources. The main source is the
general Population Census, which was last carried out for the whole population in 1999. Other
notable surveys include the Labor Force Surveys (EnquŒtes sur l’emploi) conducted by the Paris
based Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE) annually up to 2002
and quarterly since 2003.
According to the French population census which occurred in 1999, a total of 4,306,094 migrants
resided in France that year. These migrants represented 7.36 per cent of a total population of
58 520 688. The main groups of migrants were from other European countries, Africa and Asia.
The 1 934 144 migrants from European countries represented 45.0 per cent of the total number
of migrants. They mainly came from Portugal (571 874), Italy (378 649) and Spain (316 232).
African migrants (1 691 562) mainly came from Algeria (574 208), Morocco (522 504), Tunisia (201
561) and from sub-Saharan Africa (393 289). They represented 39.3 per cent of the total number
of migrants. Asian migrants (549 994) mainly came from Turkey (174 160), and Cambodia, Laos
and Vietnam (159 750). They represented 12.7 per cent of the total number of migrants. 1
The proportion of migrants from Africa has increased over time: they accounted for 33.2 per
cent of migrants in 1982 rising to 39.3 per cent in 1999. This increase was especially marked
for migrants from sub-Saharan African countries. In contrast the proportion of migrants from
European countries decreased over the same period. European migrants accounted for 57.3 per
cent of migrants in 1982 falling to 45.0 per cent in 1999. This decrease was especially attributable
to migrants from Spain and Italy.
Migrants are older than the non-migrants. In 1999 12.7 per cent of migrants were younger
1This overall analysis is presented in more detail in the survey on immigration in France written by FougŁre
(2010).
6than 24 years old (31.0 per cent in the whole population), 36.6 per cent were aged between 25
and 44 (29.1 per cent in the whole population), 32.9 per cent were aged between 45 and 64 (23.4
per cent in the whole population), and 17.8 per cent were older than 65 (16.7 per cent in the
whole population). The oldest are Spanish and Italian migrants, since they belong to the oldest
immigration waves; the youngest are migrants from Morocco, Turkey and Sub-Saharan countries.
To limit the di￿culties associated with the analysis of very large samples (since, by de￿nition,
population censuses are exhaustive), we have concentrated our statistical analysis to one-fourth
random subsamples of three censuses, namely those conducted in years 1982, 1990, and 1999.
These subsamples provide precise information about individual socioeconomic characteristics, such
as age, sex, education, matrimonial status, socioprofessional category, employment status, country
of birth and current nationality (i.e., at the date of the survey). 2 They also contain information
about the type of dwelling in which the survey respondents live, and in particular whether they live
in a social housing dwelling at the census date. Moreover, using data from the exhaustive censuses,
we have augmented this individual set of characteristics by adding local contextual covariates, such
as the total number of inhabitants in the city ( commune) where the survey respondent lives, the
proportion of persons living in social housing dwellings and the proportions of migrants from the
various possible origins in this city.
2.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports the proportions of persons residing in France at each census date (1982, 1990,
1999), according to their country (or region) of origin. These proportions are computed for people
living in France and older than 18. The population living in France is composed of approximately
90 per cent of natives (de￿ned as persons born French on the French territory). This proportion
remains stable over the period 1982-1999. Foreign born individuals and those who are born
2According to FougŁre and Sa￿ (2009), over the last ten years, 125,000 persons gained French nationality each
year on average. In France, foreign-born residents can become French either by decree, namely by decision of the
public authorities at the request of a foreigner and whether some conditions are ful￿lled, or by declaration, after a
marriage with a spouse of French,nationality.
7foreigners on the French territory form the remaining 10 per cent. 3
For each country (or region) of origin, Table 1 reports the total proportion of immigrants living
in France at the date of the census, but also the proportion of those who have gained the French
citizenship.4 Statistics calculated within the one-fourth extracts of censuses are in line with those
obtained by using the exhaustive population (FougŁre 2010). Migrants from Southern Europe
(Portugal, Spain, Italy) form the most sizeable group, corresponding to 4 per cent of the total
population in 1982, and to 3.6 per cent in 1999. Migrants from Northern Africa (Algeria, Morocco,
Tunisia) come next, representing 2.5 per cent of the French population in 1982, and 2.9 per cent
in 1999. The proportion of migrants having gained French citizenship is higher within the group
of migrants from Southern Europe (51 per cent in 1999) than within the group of migrants coming
from Northern Africa (34 per cent in 1999).
As far as it is possible, the subsequent statistical analysis will try to distinguish the country
of origin for the immigrants coming from these six countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Algeria,
Morocco, Tunisia) since they correspond to the largest migrant groups living in France. The
other groups of immigrants being less numerous, we are obliged to aggregate them for statistical
purposes. Thus immigrants from Southern-Eastern Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam) are grouped
together. This is also the case for those coming from Sub-Saharan Africa, from Eastern Europe,
from other countries of Western Europe (excluding Spain, Italy and Portugal), and from Northern
and Southern America.
[Insert Table 1 around here ]
Table 2 provides information on sociodemographic characteristics of immigrants and natives.
Compared to natives, immigrants are less frequently managers, engineers, or executives, more
often blue-collar workers or unemployed. They are also more often employed in the private sector.
They are signi￿cantly less educated, but this educational gap has decreased over our time period.
3In France, immigrants’ children become French when they turn 18, provided that they were born in France.
4In our analysis, the term ￿immigrant￿ refers to the foreign born population. The acquisition of the French
citizenship and its consequences on the employment status of immigrants residing in France has been studied by
FougŁre and Sa￿ (2009).
8For instance, in 1999, the proportion of individuals who graduated from a university (4 years of
schooling after the baccalaurØat, which is high-school ￿nal exam in France) is higher among the
migrants.
[Insert Table 2 around here ]
2.3 Who lives in social housing units?
In France, social housing can be built and/or managed by either public or private agencies. It
includes a wide range of habitations: collective buildings, individual apartments in a block of
individually owned ￿ats, private housing estate, etc. Moreover, social housing can be rented (which
is the case for the majority of households living in social housing units) or owned. However, census
information concerning social housing does not reproduce this variety of situations. In the 1982
French census, information about social housing corresponds to the whole building the household
lives in, while in the 1990 and 1999 censuses, the information concerns either the individual
apartment occupied by the interviewee or the whole building he/she lives in. In order to be
able to compare the three censuses, we thus de￿ne the dependent variable as the occupancy of
a housing unit in an HLM building. Depending on the census date, we sometimes know if the
social housing unit is rented or owned, but here again, we do not distinguish between these two
occupancy statuses for comparability concerns.
Usually, the only pre-requisite to apply to social housing is to earn below a certain threshold
(de￿ned by the municipality). However, this does not mean that everyone who is eligible will
have access to social housing. Indeed, in order to increase social diversity in social housing and
to avoid the ghettoization of the most disadvantaged populations, the thresholds are far for being
low; theoretically, 60 to 70% of the French population is indeed eligible to occupy a social housing
unit according to the income thresholds. This is clearly above the 20% legal target which is far
from being e￿ectively reached in every municipality. In a context of increasing real estate’s prices
and growing di￿culties in accommodation for middle and lower classes, this inevitably leads to a
9situation of sharp rationing in the social housing market. In Paris, for example, there are 100,000
applications each year (among which 40,000 are new), but only 8,000 housing units are allocated
a year (Dietrich-Ragon 2010). Applications are ranked according to emergency criteria, among
which extreme health and family reasons are the most important.
Once obtained, a social housing unit is very seldom vacated, which participates to the rationing
of the market. Eviction is a very complex, long and costly procedure that is almost never engaged
by social housing agencies. This leads to situations of durable - not to say endless - occupation, and
sometimes quasi-inheritance, of social housing units within some privileged (or newly privileged)
populations. In 2009, a new law has abolished the right of HLM occupants to stay in their
habitation as soon as their income is more than twice the threshold.
Most of French municipalities are of small size. According to census data, the average size of
a French municipality is 1,491 inhabitants, the median being only 352 inhabitants. This implies
for instance that, in the 1982 census, only one municipality out of four (8,689 out of 36,420)
has more than one inhabitant living in a social housing unit. Among these 8,689 municipalities,
the proportion of inhabitants living in social housing units is quite heterogenous, quartiles of the
distribution of proportions being equal to 2.9%, 6.6% and 13.4%. The municipality size and the
proportion of social housing units are positively correlated. For instance, in 1982, the median size
of municipalities with no social housing units was equal to 256 inabitants, while it was equal to
4,228 for municipalities where the proportion of persons living in social housing units was greater
than 13.4%. This was equally true in 1999.
Another issue is the stability of social housing over the period: were social-housing-friendly
municipalities the same in 1982 and 1999? To answer this question, we rank municipalities ac-
cording to their proportion of social housing units. We then consider ￿ve groups: the ￿rst group
includes municipalities with no social housing units, while the four remaining groups correspond
to the quartiles of the ditribution of the proportion of persons living in social housing units (given
that this proportion is strictly positive). We then compute the transition matrix across these
￿ve categories between 1982 and 1999. While municipalities in the extreme groups (namely, with
10either many or no social housing units), are mostly the same in 1982 and 1999, it is not so true for
intermediate categories. For instance, only 26% of municipalities who were in the second quartile
in 1982 were still in this quartile in 1999. This result is actually a matter of size. If we restrict the
analysis to the 7,624 municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants in 1982, the proportion of
persons living in social housing units drastically increased over the period: 83% of municipalities
with no social housing units in 1982 built some in the period; 21% even reached the second quartile
in 1999. For the 22,332 municipalities with less than 500 inhabitants in 1982, the change is in the
opposite direction: 88% of those with no social housing units in 1982 had still no social housing
units in 1999.
Finally, how are population changes correlated with the supply of social housing units? For that
purpose, we calculate the average variation in the total and immigrant populations within each
municipality between 1982 and 1999, according to the ￿ve previously de￿ned categories. Overall,
the total population increased in all categories, but less in the ￿rst one with no social hosuing
units (63 on average vs. 336 in the fourth quartile). The increase in the number of immigrants
is even stronger when there were initailly more social housing units in the municipality (2 on
average in municipalities with no social housing units vs. 156 in the fourth quartile). Restricting
the analysis to municipalities with less than 500 inhabitants, we ￿nd that these results vanish:
the increase in the total population and in the number of immigrants is more or less the same in
the ￿ve categories. Conversely, for the municipalities with initially more than 1,000 inhabitants,
the correlation between the variation in the number of immigrants and the initila proportion of
persons living in social housing units is maximum. Initially more social housing is correlated with
more immigrants and especially more immigrants from North Africa.
Table 3 presents the proportions of people living in a social housing dwelling, according to
their country (or region) of origin and their status with respect to French citizenship. Immigrants
from Algeria, Morocco, Turkey, Tunisia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern-Eastern Asia are, by
far, the groups that most likely live in a social housing dwelling. Whereas almost 16 per cent of
French natives live in a social housing dwelling in 1999, this proportion exceeds 50 per cent for Al-
11gerian, Moroccan and Turkish immigrants who do not have the French citizenship. It is comprised
between 40 and 50 per cent for Tunisians and Sub-Saharan Africans. Western Europeans (ex-
cluding migrants from Spain, Italy and Portugal) and Northern Americans live very unfrequently
in social housing. Having gained French citizenship does not seem to increase the probability to
live in a social housing dwelling, except for migrants coming from Sub-Saharan countries. For
instance, the proportions of migrants living in a social housing dwelling in 1982 were in general
lower among those having gained Frecn citizenship than among those who did not have French
citizenship. However, these proportions have get closer in 1999.
[Insert Table 3 around here ]
Figure 1 presents the local proportions of persons living in social housing dwellings. They are
computed by using an optimal bidimensional kernel applied to count data at the city ( commune)
level. Social housing dwellings are mostly located in the Northern part of France and in the
biggest cities. The proportions are almost the same in 1982 and 1999. Looking into details, the
few increases mostly occur in cities where social housing was scarce in 1982.
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
Figure 2 depicts the local proportions of individuals living in HLM in 1982 (left panel) and 1999
(right panel) in Paris and the administrative region around, called Ile-de-France. In Ile-de-France
as in the whole country, these proportions and the locations where they are the highest ones have
not much changed over the period. In this period, social housing dwellings are mainly located in
zones where plants are concentrated (in particular along the river Seine).
[Insert Figure 2 around here]
123 Social housing and immigrants
3.1 The geographical location of immigrants over time
The geographical distribution of immigrants on the French territory is mainly related to historical
factors (Noiriel 2002). In almost all immigration countries, waves of immigrants do not initially
spread homogeneously over the whole territory resulting in a self-generating processus of unequal
geographical distribution. Interestingly, the geographical location of immigrants in France has
been quite stable over time, as displayed by Figure 3.
In its upper panel, this ￿gure reports the proportions of immigrants calculated at the local
(city) level in years 1982 and 1999. The medium and lowest panels present proportions of im-
migrants from North Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) and from Southern Europe (Spain,
Italy and Portugal), respectively. These proportions are computed using the same method as in
Figure 1. The immigrant population in France is rather concentrated in the Eastern part of the
country. Immigrants are more numerous around Paris (in the region called Ile-de-France) and in
the South-East of France. This pattern varies across immigrant groups. While North Africans are
geographically distributed like the whole immigrant population, Italians, Portuguese and Spanish
are concentrated in three regions: the Southern-Western part of France, the Alps, and the Paris
region.
[Insert Figure 3 around here]
Figure 4 represents the local proportions of immigrants in Ile-de-France ( i.e. the region around
Paris) in 1982 (left column) and in 1999 (right column). The most notable fact is the signi￿cant
increase of the proportion of immigrants coming from Sub-Saharan countries over the period. The
increase occurred almost everywhere in the region, with the exception of its eastern part. On
the contrary, the proportions of immigrants from Southern Europe living in Ile-de-France have
decreased over the period. The proportions of immigrants from North African countries, and their
place of residence, have been stable.
13[Insert Figure 4 around here]
3.2 Social housing and immigrants : odds ratios
Figure 5 presents odds-ratios for the conditional probability to live in a social housing dwelling,
given that the individual is an immigrant, an immigrant from Maghreb, or an immigrant from
Southern Europe, respectively in years 1982 and 1999. Thus Ps[HLM | Imm] denotes the proba-
bility for an immigrant residing in the city (commune) s to live in a social housing dwelling, and
Ps[HLM | Nat] denotes the corresponding probability for a French native residing in the same




The values of this ratio OR indicate to what extent immigrants (or a given subgroup of
immigrants) are more or less likely to live in social housing than natives. For instance, if the odd-
ratio is greater than one, it means that immigrants are more likely than natives to live in a HLM in
that city. Figure 5 provides the local values of the odds-ratios OR(Imm), OR(Maghrebian Imm)
and OR(SE Imm).
[Insert Figure 5 around here]
Comparing Figures 1, 3 and 5, provides a ￿rst set of facts about inequality in immigrants access
to social housing over French territory. While immigrants are very concentrated around Paris, it
is striking to notice that the odds-ratio of the probability to live in a HLM for an immigrant is
less than 1 in this region. This probability is surprisingly higher in more rural areas, which do not
include the biggest cities and are less densely populated, such as Britanny and the center of France
(where immigrants are very rare; see Figure 3). The results do not change much from 1982 to 1999,
except for Southern Europeans. In 1982, their probability of living in a social housing dwelling is
very high almost everywhere in France. In 1999 however, this probability has decreased in most of
14the areas, but it remains high in Britanny and the South East of France. This suggests that social
housing might have worked as a transitional accommodation facility for these populations (as it
is also often the case for natives), as explicited in Edou (1998) or Barou (2002). As far as they
get more and more assimilated into French society, Italians, Spanish and Portuguese leave social
housing and most probably for private housing or home ownership. This does not seem to be the
case for North Africans; their patterns of residence in social housing buildings are very similar in
1982 and 1999, which suggests that they remain in this type of housing much longer than migrants
from Southern European migrants. More suprisingly, the areas where their probability to live in
a social housing building is higher are located in regions where their presence is rather low.
Focusing on the region around Paris shows that, between 1982 and 1999, the probability to
live in a social housing dwelling conditional on being an immigrant from Sub-Saharan Africa,
an immigrant from North-Africa, or an immigrant from Southern Europe, has decreased for all
immigrants in this region, especially for those coming from Sub-Saharan and Southern-European
countries (see Figure 6).
[Insert Figure 6 around here]
Of course, the previous analysis is just descriptive. The following section is devoted to a
regression analysis that helps understanding the extent to which observable personal and city
characteristics may explain these descriptive patterns.
3.3 Social determinants for living in social housing
Table 4 reports parameter estimates of a linear probability model in which the explained variable
is the proportion of persons living in a social housing dwelling within a given cell. 5 In fact,
most cells comprise only a very limited number of observations. Hence, the data are virtually
5The cells are obtained by crossing all the possible values of the covariates considered in the models. The
standard errors of the estimates take into account the fact that statistical units are cells, and not individuals, by
using the heteroskedastic covariance matrix adapted to clusters. Estimates reported in Tables 5 and 6 are also
obtained by applying the same method.
15individual. In particular, the city is identi￿ed and its interaction with person level characteristics
allow us to have a very large number of observations per city and per year. Hence, all ensuing
Tables include city ￿xed e￿ects. Results reported in Table 4 show that in general, migrants live
more frequently in social housing buildings than French natives, other observables being equal. In
particular, this probability is higher for migrants from Turkey, Morocco, Southeast Asia, Algeria,
Tunisia and Sub-Saharan Africa (in descending order). It is generally lower for migrants who have
gained French citizenship (excepted for migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa). Women are more
likely to live in a social housing dwelling than men. It is also the case for singles and lone mothers.
Socio-professional category and educational attainment also have a highly signi￿cant e￿ect on this
probability. It is higher for blue-collar and white-collar workers, unemployed workers, but also for
public ￿rm workers and civil servants. This probability is a decreasing function of age, but it has
increased through time, because of the increase in the public housing stock over the period.
[Insert Table 4 around here ]
Tables 5 incorporates second-order interaction terms between the geographical origin of mi-
grants (Northern Africa, Southern Europe, other countries) and some contextual local covariates,
such as the logarithm of the city population, the proportion of persons living in public housing
dwellings in this city, and the proportions of migrants from Northern Africa, Southern Europe or
other countries (excluding Spain, Italy, Portugal, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia) in the same city.
Southern Europeans are the only migrants more likely than natives to live in a public housing
dwelling when the size of the city is large. In addition, all migrants are more likely (than natives)
to live in a HLM when the proportion of people living in social housing is large. However, North
Africans are less likely to live in a HLM than natives when the fraction of migrants, including
themselves, is large in the city. Because the fraction of natives in the city is equal to one minus
the sum of all groups of migrants, it essentially means that North Africans are more likely to live
in a HLM when the proportion of natives is large in the city. Interestingly, this feature is observed
for all groups of migrants. Hence, migrants tend to live in HLM when many natives live in the
16city.
[Insert Table 5 around here ]
Table 6 improves on Table 5 by introducing third-order interactions between the individual
origin of the migrants, the fraction of people living in a HLM in the city, and the fraction of
migrants of each origin in the city. Again, the omitted category comprises the natives. First, let
us examine the main second-order e￿ects. They are broadly in line with those found in Table 5.
Here, though, all migrants are less likely to live in a HLM than natives in large cities (Southern
Europeans rather than positive in Table 5 are identical to natives in this respect). Again, when
the fraction of inhabitants living in a HLM is large in the city, migrants are less likely than natives
to inhabit a HLM. Again, in broad agreement with results in Table 5, migrants are in general
more likely to live in a HLM when the fraction of natives is large in the city. Now, the third-order
interactions show that, in cities with many HLMs and many migrants (irrespective of the origin),
migrants are less likely to inhabit a social housing. Put di￿erently, migrants of all origins live less
often in a HLM when the city has plenty of social housing and when the fraction of natives is
high. Can we talk of discrimination? There is no causal evidence, just some indicative elements.
[Insert Table 6 around here ]
To understand how the allocation of migrants, HLM housing, and migrants within HLMs,
evolved through time and space, Table 7 presents regressions of indicators for individuals living in
a HLM, being native... on a full set of city indicators. Each line corresponds to a variable, each
column corresponds to a Census year. The Table presents the R-square of the regression. Hence,
it measures the amount of dispersion explained by the city and time in each of the variables under
study. Results show the following. First, HLM are extremely ￿dispersed￿ across France: some
cities have zero HLMs when others have a lot. Natives are apparently quite inequally ￿dispersed￿,
more than migrants at least. Surprisingly, migrants are more inequally spread out over the French
territory than natives. Furthermore, ￿segregation￿ increased over the period for natives as well as
for other migrants, except Southern Europeans who have had the tendency to be spread more
17equally over the French territory. Finally, among those living in HLMs, North Africans and other
migrants have become more and more ￿segregated￿ when natives and Southern Europeans have
become less so.
[Insert Table 7 around here ]
Finally, Table 8 shows the results of a regression of the di￿erence in the proportions of di￿erent
groups of migrants in 1999 on the same di￿erence in proportions in 1982. Essentially, if the
coe￿cient is small or even negative, it means that there is no persistance, or even reversion in the
location choices of migrants. If the coe￿cients are positive, then initial choices (sometimes forces,
indeed) persist. And this is what we observe. Most coe￿cients are close to one.
[Insert Table 8 around here ]
4 Conclusion
In this study, we have examined the empirical links between social housing policy and location
choices of immigrants in France. More speci￿cally, we have tried to characterize the main individ-
ual and contextual determinants of the probability for immigrants to live in a HLM, which is the
main public housing policy in France. For that purpose, we use individual information coming
from large (one-fourth) extracts of the French population censuses conducted by INSEE (Paris)
in 1982, 1990, and 1999.
Our estimates show that, in general, migrants live more frequently in social housing than French
natives, other observables being equal. In particular, this probability is higher for migrants from
Turkey, Morocco, Southeast Asia, Algeria, Tunisia and Sub-Saharan Africa (in descending order).
It is generally lower for migrants who have gained French citizenship (excepted for migrants from
Sub-Saharan Africa).
We ￿nd also that migrants are less likely to live in a HLM than natives in large cities. When
the fraction of inhabitants living in a HLM is large in the city, migrants are less likely than
18natives to live in a HLM. Moreover, migrants are in general more likely to live in a HLM when the
fraction of natives is large in the city. On the whole, in cities with many HLMs and many migrants
(irrespective of the origin), migrants are less likely to inhabit a social housing. Put di￿erently,
migrants of all origins live less often in a HLM when the city has plenty of social housing and
when the fraction of natives is high.
The ongoing economic crisis should create greater di￿culties in the access of immigrants to
social housing. Several o￿cial reports have underlined that, nowadays in France, 3.5 millions of
persons are living in poor housing conditions and that 1.5 million of persons are waiting to have
access to an HLM dwelling. 6 This excess demand may correspond to 900,000 dwellings. This
explains why housing prices have increased by 150 percent on average between 1995 and 2008,
while the average income of households has only increased by 60 percent during the same period.
Meanwhile, rents rose twice as fast as in￿ation. Nowadays, expenses related to housing correspond
to 33 percent of the household average disposable income. No doubt that immigrants will bear
the brunt of this shortage in the next few years. Policy recommendations which could help to
limit their di￿culties include a substantial and fast increase in the supply of public housing, but
also the introduction of a more equitable procedure of allocation of applicants to HLM dwellings
(by using, for instance, anonymous applications).
In a further study, we will concentrate both on the movements between public and private
housing both for natives and for immigrants. This study, that will use individual longitudinal
data, should improve our understanding on the impact of the French public housing policy on
location choices of immigrants.
6See, for instance, the newspaper "Le Monde" dated Wednesday, May 5, 2010, page 16.
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Figure 2: Local proportions of individuals living in a social housing dwelling, in 1982 (left panel)

































23Figure 3: Local proportions of immigrants, immigrants from North-Africa, and immigrants from
















































































































































































































































24Figure 4: Local proportions of immigrants from Sub-saharan Africa, immigrants from North-
Africa, and immigrants from Southern Europe, in 1982 (left column) and 1999 (right column),


















































































































25Figure 5: Odds-ratios for the probability to live in a social housing dwelling, conditional on being
an immigrant, an immigrant from North-Africa, or an immigrant from Southern Europe, in 1982
















































































































































































26Figure 6: Odds-ratios for the probability to live in a social housing dwelling, conditional on being
an immigrant from Sub-saharan Africa, an immigrant from North-Africa, or an immigrant from


















































27Figure 7: Simulated proportion of North-African migrants living in HLM as a function of the
proportion of people living in HLM in the municipality, according to the proportions of migrants
from North Africa and Southern Europe
































































North−Africans: 3%; South. Europeans: 6%
North−Africans: 7%; South. Europeans: 3%
North−Africans: 3%; South. Europeans: 3%
Note: Simulations based on the estimates of the model parameters reported in Table 6
Figure 8: Simulated proportion of Southern-European migrants living in HLM as a function of the
proportion of people living in HLM in the municipality, according to the proportions of migrants
from North Africa and Southern Europe













































































North−Africans: 3%; South. Europeans: 6%
North−Africans: 7%; South. Europeans: 3%
North−Africans: 3%; South. Europeans: 3%
Note: Simulations based on the estimates of the model parameters reported in Table 6
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